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Causal Pitfalls in the Decomposition
of Wage Gaps
Martin HUBER
University of Fribourg, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland (martin.huber@unifr.ch)
The decomposition of gender or ethnic wage gaps into explained and unexplained components (often
with the aim to assess labor market discrimination) has been a major research agenda in empirical
labor economics. This article demonstrates that conventional decompositions, no matter whether linear or
nonparametric, are equivalent to assuming a (probably too) simple model of mediation (aimed at assessing
causal mechanisms) and may therefore lack causal interpretability. The reason is that decompositions
typically control for post-birth variables that lie on the causal pathway from gender/ethnicity (which
are determined at or even before birth) to wage but neglect potential endogeneity that may arise from
this approach. Based on the newer literature on mediation analysis, we therefore provide more attractive
identifying assumptions and discuss nonparametric identification based on reweighting.
KEY WORDS: Causal mechanisms; Mediation; Wage decomposition.
1. INTRODUCTION
The decomposition of empirically observed wage gaps across
gender or ethnicity has continued to attract substantial attention
in labor economics. The idea is to disentangle the total gap into
an explained component that can be attributed to differences
in (observed) labor market relevant characteristics such as edu-
cation and occupation and an unexplained remainder, which is
often interpreted as discrimination. In addition to the classical
linear decomposition of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), the
use of more flexible nonparametric decomposition methods has
been proposed, for instance by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(1996), Barsky et al. (2002), Fro¨lich (2007), Mora (2008), and
Nopo (2008). Furthermore, the literature has also moved from
the mere assessment of mean gaps to decompositions at particu-
lar quantiles in the outcome distribution, see Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993), DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Machado
and Mata (2005), Melly (2005), Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(2007, 2009), and Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly
(2009).
These advancements in the estimation of decompositions
stand in stark contrast to the lack of a formal identification the-
ory in many if not most studies, as also pointed out by Fortin,
Lemieux, and Firpo (2011): “In econometrics, the standard ap-
proach is to first discuss identification(...)and then introduce
estimation procedures to recover the object we want to iden-
tify. In the decomposition literature, most papers jump directly
to the estimation issues (i.e., discuss procedures) without first
addressing the identification problem.”
To close this gap, the main contribution of this article is to
shed light on the (plausibility of the) identifying assumptions
required for disentangling explained and unexplained compo-
nents. It will be demonstrated that conventional decompositions
of gender and ethnic wage gaps can be equivalently expressed
as a system of equations that corresponds to a (probably too)
simple model for mediation analysis, which allows explicat-
ing the rather strong identifying assumptions underlying most
of the literature. Mediation analysis, as outlined in the semi-
nal article of Baron and Kenny (1986), aims at disentangling
the causal mechanisms through which an explanatory variable
affects an outcome of interest, with mediators being interme-
diate outcomes lying on the causal pathway between the ex-
planatory variable and the outcome. Applied to the context of
wage decompositions, gender and ethnicity can be regarded as
variables that stand at the beginning of any individual’s causal
chain affecting wage, because they are determined at or prior
to birth. Education, occupation, work experience, etc., are all
mediators because they occur later in life and are thus po-
tentially driven by gender and ethnicity, while the mediators
themselves likely affect wage. If we accept this causal struc-
ture, which in terms of the time line of events in life appears
to be the only reasonable choice, then the explained component
of the wage gap can be shown to correspond to the “indirect”
wage effect of gender or ethnicity that operates through these
mediators. Conversely, the unexplained component equals the
“direct” effect of gender or ethnicity on wage that either is in-
herently direct or operates through unobserved mediators (e.g.,
discrimination).
Disentangling direct and indirect effects requires condition-
ing on the mediators while also controlling for confounders
jointly related with the outcome, the mediators, and/or the ini-
tial explanatory variable, see Judd and Kenny (1981) for an
early discussion of the confounding problem in mediation. The
identification issue arising in many decompositions is that they
merely incorporate mediators but typically neglect potential
confounders, which may jeopardize the causal interpretability
of the explained and unexplained components. For example,
assume that even conditional on the initial variable gender or
ethnicity, family background (such as parents’ education) affects
both the mediator education and the outcome variable wage, for
instance through unobserved personality traits like self-esteem
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(see Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006).1 Then, using
education in the decomposition without controlling for fam-
ily background generally biases the explained and unexplained
components in the wage decomposition. The reason is that ed-
ucation is itself already an intermediate outcome such that con-
ditioning on it without accounting for confounders is likely to
introduce bias, a problem thoroughly discussed in Rosenbaum
(1984) and Robins and Greenland (1992), among many others.
It is important to note that theoretical cases in which conven-
tional decompositions bear a causal interpretation do exist, but
may appear unrealistic. The first scenario is that there are no con-
founders of gender/ethnicity—henceforth referred to as group
variables—and/or the mediators, which seems quite restrictive.
The second scenario is a reversal of the causal chain of the group
variable and the mediators. If the observed characteristics related
to the explained component were determined prior to the group
variable (rather than vice versa) and included all confounders
of the group variable, the decomposition would satisfy the kind
of conditional independence assumption frequently imposed in
the treatment evaluation literature, see Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) and Imbens (2004). Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011)
pointed out that in this case, the unexplained component corre-
sponds to the “treatment effect on the treated” or “nontreated”
(depending on the reference group) of the treatment evaluation
literature, while the explained component reflects the selection
bias into the group variable. Unfortunately, this framework ap-
pears ill-suited for decompositions related to gender and ethnic-
ity, which naturally stand at the beginning of any causal chain in
an individual’s life. Even potentially interesting group variables
occurring later in life like unionization may at least partially
affect variables we would consider important for the explained
component, such as tenure with the current employer.
Therefore, as a second contribution this article suggests the
use of arguably more realistic identifying assumptions for wage
decompositions (by borrowing from the newer literature on
mediation analysis) that allow for confounding of the group
variable and mediators and also discusses nonparametric iden-
tification. Given the satisfaction of the assumptions, the un-
explained and explained components bear a clear causal in-
terpretation. Identification relies on a sequential ignorability
assumption as (among others) discussed in Imai, Keele, and
Yamamoto (2010), implying that all confounders of the group
variable and the mediators are observed. Using the approach
suggested in Huber (2013), the explained and unexplained
components are then nonparametrically identified by reweight-
ing observations as a function of their propensities to be in
a group (i) given the confounders and (ii) given the con-
founders and mediators. We provide a brief simulation study
that conveys the identification issues in wage decompositions.
As an empirical illustration, we use the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to estimate the decomposi-
tion of the ethnic wage gap among males in the year 2000.
Our results are not robust to the choice of identifying as-
sumptions, suggesting that conventional decompositions may
be substantially biased. Albeit more general than the standard
1Analyzing Brazilian earnings data, Lam and Schoeni (1993) argued in a similar
manner that family background is correlated with unobserved worker charac-
teristics that affect earnings, while also driving education.
Figure 1. A graphical representation of the decomposition.
decomposition, it has to be stressed that the assumptions pro-
posed in this article are not innocuous either. Besides requir-
ing the observability of all confounders, they also rule out that
some confounders of the mediators are themselves a func-
tion of the group variable. Alternative identification strate-
gies allowing for the latter case are therefore also briefly dis-
cussed and may be considered in future research on wage
decompositions.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 shows the equivalence of conventional decompositions
and simple mediation models, given that the group variable
precedes the observed characteristics (mediators). Second, it
discusses arguably more realistic identifying assumptions and
identification based on reweighting. Section 3 provides a brief
simulation study, while Section 4 presents an application to the
NLSY79. Section 5 concludes.
2. MODELS AND IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS
2.1 Notation and Definition of Parameters
For reasons discussed in Section 1, we will assume through-
out that the group variable precedes the observed characteristics
we would like to adjust for in the decomposition. Let G denote
the binary group variable (e.g., female/male or black/white), Y
the outcome of interest (e.g., log wage) and X the vector of
observed characteristics (e.g., age, education, work experience,
occupation, industry). Xk corresponds to the kth element in X
with k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K} and K being the number of character-
istics so that X = [X1, . . . , XK ]. A graphical representation of
the causal mechanism considered is given in Figure 1, where
the arrows represent a causal relation. G (e.g., gender) has an
effect on the mediators X (e.g., education and occupation) which
themselves affect Y (log wage). At the same time, G also in-
fluences Y “directly.” However, it is important to note that this
causal path need not be inherently direct, but may also or even
exclusively include (unobserved) mediators not appearing in X.
For example, gender and ethnicity most likely affect the percep-
tion of individual traits by decision makers in the labor market
(see the discussion in Greiner and Rubin 2011), which in turn
may entail discriminatory behavior that adds to the unexplained
component in wage gaps.2
To formally define the causal parameters of interest, we de-
note by Y (g) and X(g) the potential outcome and mediators
2Even if we followed the principle “No causation without manipulation” and
were uncomfortable with investigating causal effects of immutable character-
istics like gender and ethnicity, see Greiner and Rubin (2011), acknowledging
that the causal relations in Figure 1 run through perceived treats may render
wage decompositions nevertheless interesting. The reason is that in contrast to
factual gender and ethnicity, the perception of these (or related) characteristics
may in principal be (experimentally) manipulable, see, for instance, Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004).
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when exogenously setting G to g, with g ∈ {1, 0} (see, for
instance, Rubin 1974 for an introduction to the potential out-
come framework). E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)) therefore gives the total
average causal effect of G on Y , represented by the sum of di-
rect and indirect (i.e., operating through X) effects in Figure 1.
E(X(1)) − E(X(0)), on the other hand, is the average causal ef-
fect of G on X (represented by the arrow of G to X in Figure 1),
so to speak the “first stage” of the indirect effect. Furthermore,
assume that the conditional mean of the potential outcome Y (g)
given X is characterized by the following linear model:
E(Y (g)|X) = c(g) +
K∑
k=1
Xkβk(g), g ∈ {1, 0}. (1)
c(g) is a constant and the vector β(g) = [β1(g), . . . , βK (g)]
contains the (linear) effects of the mediators on the potential
outcome, which (as implied by our notation) may differ across
g = 1, 0 and therefore allow for group-mediator-interaction ef-
fects. The sum of elements in β(g) corresponds to the “second
stage” of the indirect effect, namely the causal arrow from X to
Y in Figure 1, which is permitted to depend on the group state.
After having defined all ingredients of our causal framework,
the total causal effect can be decomposed into the indirect effect
explained by the mediators, denoted by ψ , and the unexplained
direct effect, denoted by η, as follows:
E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0))
=
∑K
k=1[E(Xk(1)) − E(Xk(0))]βk(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained component (ψ)
+ (c(1) − c(0)) +
∑K
k=1 E(Xk(0))(βk(1) − βk(0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained component (η)
. (2)
To see this, first note that E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)) = E[Y (1)|
E(X(1))] − E[Y (0)|E(X(0))] under the linear model postu-
lated in (1). Second, E[Y (1)|E(X(1))] − E[Y (0)|E(X(0))] =
{E[Y (1)|E(X(1))] − E[Y (1)|E(X(0))]} + {E[Y (1)|E(X(0))]
− E[Y (0)|E(X(0))]} by subtracting and adding E[Y (1)|
E(X(0))]. Third, again by equation (1), E[Y (1)|E(X(1))] −
E[Y (1)|E(X(0))] = ψ and E[Y (1)|E(X(0))] − E[Y (0)|
E(X(0))] = η.
2.2 Linking Conventional Wage Gap Decompositions
to Mediation Models
We demonstrate that the linear decomposition of Blinder
(1973) and Oaxaca (1973) (i) can be equivalently expressed
as a rather simple mediation model and (ii) fails to identify the
causal paths in Figure 1 or equivalently, the true explained and
unexplained components in (2) if G and/or X is confounded.
We start by recalling the standard decomposition, where it is as-
sumed that the observed outcome within a group is characterized
by the linear equation
Y g = cg +
K∑
k=1
X
g
kβ
g
k + g, g ∈ {1, 0}. (3)
Y g and Xgk denote the conditional outcome and the conditional
observed characteristics given G = g.3 Likewise, cg and βg =
[βg1 , . . . , βgK ] represent the constant and the slope coefficients,
while g denotes the error term, again conditional on the group
variable. It is typically assumed (see, e.g., Fortin, Lemieux, and
Firpo 2011) that
E(g|Xg) = E(|X,G = g) = 0, g ∈ {1, 0}, (4)
for which conditional independence of g and Xg is a sufficient
condition (while  denotes the unconditional error).
We assume that we have an iid sample drawn from {Y,X,G}
consisting of n observations. Denote by ¯Y g and ¯Xg the sam-
ple averages of Y and X conditional on G = g, with ¯Xg =
[ ¯Xg1 , . . . , ¯XgK ]. The standard decomposition of Blinder (1973)
and Oaxaca (1973) is given by
¯Y 1 − ¯Y 0 =
∑K
k=1
(
¯X1k − ¯X0k
)
ˆβ1k︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained component ( ˆψ)
+ (cˆ1 − cˆ0) +
∑K
k=1
¯X0k
(
ˆβ1k − ˆβ0k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained component (ηˆ)
. (5)
ˆβ1k ,
ˆβ0k denote the estimates of the coefficients β1k , β0k and
ηˆ, ˆψ those of the unexplained and explained components,
respectively.
If G stands at the beginning of the causal mechanism affecting
Y as displayed in Figure 1, one can easily translate the standard
decomposition into a simple mediation model. The latter con-
sists of a system of linear equations characterizing each media-
tor as a function of G and an error term ν and the outcome as a
function of G, X, the interactions of G and X, and an error term :
Xk = cXk + Gαk + νk, for k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, (6)
Y = cY + Gδ +
K∑
k=1
Xkθk +
K∑
k=1
GXkγk + . (7)
cXk , αk, νk denote the constant, coefficient, and error term in
the equation of the kth element in X. If applicable, we denote
by the respective parameter without subscript k the vector of K
elements, for example, α = [α1, α2, . . . , αK ]. cY , δ, θ represent
the constant and the coefficients on G and X in the outcome
equation, respectively, while γ denotes the coefficients on the
interactions. It is obvious that a causal interpretation of the
various coefficients and the identification of direct and indirect
effects generally requires that ν is not associated with G, and
 is not associated with G and X. Therefore, this rather simple
model rules out confounding of G and/or X.
We now demonstrate that the indirect effect of G on Y work-
ing through X in our linear mediation model (i.e., the effect
of G on X times the effect of X on Y) corresponds to the ex-
plained component in a wage decomposition. Imai, Keele, and
Yamamoto (2010) provided the expression of the indirect effect
for a scalar mediator Xk when interaction between G and Xk is
allowed for as in (7): αk(θk + Gγk). It follows that the (overall)
indirect effect through all mediators is the sum of the indirect
3Note the difference to Equation (1), which is defined in terms of potential
outcomes Y (g) rather than conditional outcomes Yg .
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effects through each mediator:
(overall) indirect effect =
K∑
k=1
αk(θk + Gγk). (8)
Considering Xk , we note that in Equation (6), which contains
a single binary regressor, the constant corresponds to the aver-
age mediator conditional on G = 0, that is, cXk = E(X0k ), while
αk = E(X1k ) − E(X0k ). Furthermore, any coefficient θk reflects
the effect of Xk on Y conditional on G = 0 and is therefore
equal to β0k in (3). Correspondingly, the coefficient on the inter-
action term of G and Xk gives the difference in the effects of Xk
given G = 1 and G = 0, that is, γk = (β1k − β0k ). It follows that
the indirect effect given in (8) conditional on G = 1 is identi-
cal to the probability limit (plim) of the explained component
ˆψ in (5): ∑Kk=1 αk(θk + Gγk) = ∑Kk=1[E(X1k ) − E(X0k )](β0k +
(β1k − β0k )) =
∑K
k=1[E(X1k ) − E(X0k )]β1k .
Second, we show that the direct effect is equal to the un-
explained component. Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010) pro-
vided the expression for the direct effect under our linear medi-
ation model:
direct effect = δ +
K∑
k=1
γk(cXk + αkG). (9)
Note that δ reflects the part of the direct effect that is net of in-
teractions with X. This obviously corresponds to the differences
in the constants in Equation (3) for G = 1 and G = 0, which
would be an alternative way to identify the effect of switch-
ing G when holding X fixed. Therefore, δ = c1 − c0. Condi-
tional on G = 0, (9) simplifies to δ +∑Kk=1 cXkγk . By recalling
that cXk = E(X0k ) and γk = (β1k − β0k ), it follows that this corre-
sponds to the plim of the unexplained component ηˆ in (5): δ +∑K
k=1 γk(cXk + αkG) = (c1 − c0) +
∑K
k=1 E(X0k )(β1k − β0k ).
Linking the standard decomposition to the mediation model
highlights that the estimates ˆψ and ηˆ in (5) only bear a causal in-
terpretation and converge to the true explained and unexplained
components ψ and η in (2) as n increases under the following
conditions: (i) G is exogenous, that is, not confounded by ν, and
(ii) X is exogenous conditional on G, that is, not confounded by
 such that Equation (4) holds. Exogeneity of G implies that the
group variable is as good as randomly assigned w.r.t.  (which
enters Y) as well as any unobservables affecting X. This would
for instance be violated if family background (e.g., parents’ ed-
ucation and socio-economic status) was unobserved, entered ,
and was also correlated with the group variable. Therefore, one
might be particularly concerned if G represents ethnicity, while
gender is arguably randomly assigned by nature. However, even
in the latter case, one could think of possible violations of ex-
ogeneity if for instance gender bias and thus, the gender ratio
(through the inclination to get more children conditional on the
gender of the first child) differed systematically across socio-
economic groups.
If G is confounded by , the conditional mean outcome
E(Y g) = E(Y |G = g), which is the plim of ¯Y g , does not
correspond to the mean potential outcome E(Y (g)). There-
fore, the left hand side of Equation (5) does not converge to
E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)) such that not even the total causal effect
of G on Y (the sum of the explained and unexplained compo-
nents) is identified. Similarly, there might exist unobservables
that jointly affect G and X, which could even overlap with those
in  (e.g., family background drives educational choices). Then,
E(Xg) = E(X|G = g), the plim of ¯Xg , does not correspond to
the mean potential mediator state E(X(g)). It follows that the
right-hand side of (5) is asymptotically biased (i.e., does not
correspond to the right-hand side of (2)) even if the left-hand
side (i.e., the total effect) was identified.
We now consider the second issue that conditional exogeneity
of X given G does not hold, implying that the effect of X on Y
is confounded by  even conditional on G. As in standard OLS
models, this implies that the coefficients βg and cg in Equation
(3) differ from the parameters β(g) and c(g) in the true causal
model (1). Therefore, the right-hand side of (5) does not con-
verge to the true decomposition (2) even if G was exogenous.
Figure 2 illustrates scenarios in which identification fails. In (a),
 jointly affects G and Y whereas in (b), the unobserved term
ν jointly affects G and X. Under both (a) and (b), exogeneity
of G does not hold. In (c),  jointly affects X and Y (even con-
ditional on G) such that (4) is violated. In applications, several
issues might occur at the same time. Note that identification also
fails if the respective unobserved terms do not directly influence
G and/or X, but are correlated with further unobservables that
affect the group variable or the mediator, respectively. Further-
more,  and ν might be correlated or even overlap.
Summing up, formulating the standard decomposition in
terms of a mediation model facilitates understanding the as-
sumptions required for causal inference, which are obvi-
ously not very attractive: cX and α, and thus E(X(0)) and
E(X(1)) − E(X(0)), are only identified if G is not confounded
by ν. Likewise, δ, θ , and γ and thus, c(1) − c(0), β(0), and
(β(1) − β(0)) are only identified if  does not confound G and/or
X. Otherwise, the unexplained and explained components in (5)
are asymptotically biased and not to be causally interpreted.
In addition, the standard decomposition imposes linearity and
homogeneous effects within group states. Only if all these con-
ditions do hold, the explained component corresponds to the
indirect effect in a mediation model for G = 1, for example, be-
ing male. It then reflects the wages differentials between males
and females due to group-induced differences in the mediators
(X(1), X(0)) assessed at the males’ rate of returns to the media-
tors (e.g., the returns to education and occupation). In contrast,
the unexplained component corresponds to the direct effect for
G = 0 , for example, being female. It is the (potentially discrim-
inatory) effect of gender on wage when holding the mediators
fixed at their values among females, X(0). As well acknowl-
edged in the mediation literature, the direct and indirect effects
defined on opposite group states add up to the total effect of G,
namely E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)), the left-hand side of (2).
Figure 2. Scenarios in which identification fails.
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The question remains whether standard wage decompo-
sitions are useful at all in the arguably more realistic case
of confounding, where the average observed differences
E(Y 1) − E(Y 0) and E(X1) − E(X0) deviate from the average
causal effects E(Y (1) − Y (0)) and E(X(1) − X(0)). While
observed differences are descriptive about the status quo,
they appear less suitable for deriving policy conclusions,
which usually rely on causal inference based on comparing
counterfactual states of the world. Basing wage decompositions
on observed differences without controlling for confounders
therefore gives explained and unexplained components that
are hard to interpret. As elsewhere in econometrics, it is not
obvious what to make of numbers obtained by conditioning on
a battery of endogenous variables (in our case the mediators and
the group variable). In this light, the terminology “explained
component” may even appear misleading, because neither do
endogenous group states causally explain observed differences
in mediators, nor do endogenous group states and mediators
causally explain observed differences in outcomes. One should
also be cautious with interpreting the unexplained component
as labor market discrimination, as often seen in the literature,
because this would be a causal claim, too: namely, that a
part of the supposedly causal effect of G on wage which
materializes in the observed wage gap is not driven by observed
differences in the mediators, but by other (and unobserved)
causal mechanisms like discrimination. As with the explained
component, endogeneity jeopardizes the identification of the
unexplained component based on standard decompositions.
The latter may therefore not be very meaningful for deriving
policy recommendations, as also argued by Kunze (2008).
2.3 An Alternative Set of Identifying Assumptions
We suggest the use of a different set of assumptions that
extends standard decompositions in two dimensions: first, we
allow for confounding of the group variable and the medi-
ators, as long as it is related to observed covariates, which
we denote by W. Second, we ease the linearity assumptions,
which may entail misleading results due to functional form
restrictions and inadequate extrapolation (see Barsky et al.
2002). Instead, we consider (at least for identification) a fully
nonparametric model that maximizes flexibility in terms of
model specification. To this end, we introduce a more general
notation for the explained and unexplained components that
comes from the nonparametric mediation literature (e.g., Pearl
2001; Robins 2003). First of all, note that instead of defining a
potential outcome as a function of the group variable only, we
may equivalently define it as a function of the group variable and
the potential mediators on the causal pathway from the group to
the outcome. In fact, Y (g) = Y (g,X(g)). This change in nota-
tion makes explicit that the potential outcome is affected by the
group variable both directly and indirectly via X(g). It allows
us to rewrite the total effect of G on Y (the left-hand side of
(2)) as E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)) = E[Y (1, X(1))] − E[Y (0, X(0))].
More importantly, the latter expression can (by subtracting and
adding E[Y (1, X(0))] on the right-hand side) be disentangled
into the indirect effect (or explained component) due to varying
X(1) and X(0) while keeping the group fixed at G = 1 and the
direct effect (or unexplained component) of G while keeping
Figure 3. A causal framework in which sequential ignorability
holds.
the mediators fixed at X(0):
E[Y (1, X(1))] − E[Y (0, X(0))]
= E[Y (1, X(1))] − E[Y (1, X(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
+E[Y (1, X(0))] − E[Y (0, X(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
. (10)
See also the discussion of these two components in Flores and
Flores-Lagunes (2009), who derived an equivalent decomposi-
tion in their Equation (2).
Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010) provided a sequen-
tial ignorability assumption under which E[Y (1, X(1))],
E[Y (0, X(0))], and E[Y (1, X(0))] are identified.4 Identify-
ing the latter parameter is particularly challenging because
Y (1, X(0)) is never observed.
Assumption 1 (sequential ignorability).
(a) {Y (g′, x), X(g)}⊥G|W for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the
support of X,
(b)Y (g′, x)⊥X|G = g,W = w for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w
in the support of X,W ,
(c) Pr(G = g|X = x,W = w) > 0 for all g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w
in the support of X,W .
By Assumption 1(a), G is conditionally independent of the
mediators and of any unobservable factors jointly affecting the
group status on the one hand and the mediator and/or the out-
come on the other hand, given the observed confounders W.
Assumption 1(b) imposes conditional independence of the me-
diator given the confounders and the group status. That is, con-
ditional on G and W, the effect of the mediator on the outcome
is assumed to be unconfounded. Assumption 1(c) is a common
support restriction requiring that the conditional probability to
be in a particular group given X and W (henceforth referred to as
propensity score) is larger than zero. Note that by Bayes’ theo-
rem, Assumption 1(c) equivalently implies that Pr(X = x|G =
g,W = w) > 0 (or in the case of X being continuous, that the
conditional density of X given G and W is larger than zero:
fX|G,W (x, g,w) > 0). That is, conditional on W, the mediator
state must not be a deterministic function of the group, otherwise
identification is infeasible due to a lack of comparable units in
terms of X across groups. Furthermore, from Assumption 1(c) it
also follows that Pr(G = g|W = w) > 0 for all g ∈ {0, 1} and
w in the support of W, which must hold to find comparable
units in terms of the confounders W. Figure 3 displays a causal
framework that is in line with sequential ignorability.
4Equivalent or closely related assumptions were considered in Pearl (2001),
Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009), Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010), and
Tchetgen Tchetgen, and Shpitser (2012), among others.
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The following linear model satisfies the sequential ignorabil-
ity assumption if ν is conditionally independent of G given W
and  is conditionally independent of G and X given W. Note
that this parametric specification does not require the common
support Assumption 1(c) due to the possibility to extrapolate
beyond observed data, which, however, comes at the cost of
considerably stronger functional form assumptions than needed
for nonparametric identification:
Xk = cXk + Gαk +
J∑
j=1
Wjωjk + νk, for k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
(11)
Y = cY + Gδ +
K∑
k=1
Xkθk +
K∑
k=1
GXkγk +
J∑
j=1
Wjλjk + .
(12)
Given that the conditional independence assumptions are
satisfied, we can in principle allow for a much more flexible
nonparametric model when identifying the explained and unex-
plained components:
Xk = χk(G,W, ν), for k ∈ {1, . . . , K} (13)
Y = φ(G,X,W, ), (14)
φ and χ are general functions that remain unspecified by the re-
searcher, so that linearity and homogeneous effects within group
states need not be assumed as it is the case in the standard decom-
position. Note that the potential outcome notation can be read-
ily translated into this nonparametric model: E[Y (g,X(g′))] =
E[φ(g,X(g′),W, )] = E[φ(g, χk(g′,W, ν),W, )] for g, g′ ∈
{1, 0}.
Under Assumption 1, Propositions 1 and 2 in Huber (2013)
for the identification of direct and indirect effects can be used
to nonparametrically identify the explained and unexplained
components based on reweighting observations by the inverse
of the propensity scores Pr(G = 1|X,W ) and Pr(G = 1|W ):
ψ = E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|W )
]
−E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1 − Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1 − Pr(G = 1|W )
]
,(15)
η = E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1 − Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1 − Pr(G = 1|W )
]
−E
[
Y · (1 − G)
1 − Pr(G = 1|W )
]
. (16)
The proof of this result is provided in Appendix A. E[ Y ·GPr(G=1|W ) ]
and E[ Y ·(1−G)1−Pr(G=1|W ) ] correspond to the mean potential outcomes
E(Y (1)) and E(Y (0)), because weighting by the inverse of
Pr(G = 1|W ) and 1 − Pr(G = 1|W ), respectively, adjusts the
distribution of confounders W given G = 1, 0 to that in the
total population. E[ Y ·GPr(G=1|X,W ) · 1−Pr(G=1|X,W )1−Pr(G=1|W ) ], on the other hand, iden-
tifies E[Y (1, X(0))], because the law of iterated expectations
and Bayes’ theorem imply that 1−Pr(G=1|X,W )Pr(G=1|X,W )·(1−Pr(G=1|W )) reweights
W,X given G = 1 to the distribution of W,X(0) in the total
population.
The attractiveness of expressions (15) and (16) is that they
can be straightforwardly estimated by their sample counter-
parts with (parametric or nonparametric) plug-in estimators for
the propensity scores Pr(G = 1|X,W ) and Pr(G = 1|W ). How-
ever, estimation based on weighting also has its drawbacks: if
the common support assumption 1(c) is close to being violated,
estimation may be unstable due to an explosion of the variance,
see for instance (Khan and Tamer 2010). Furthermore, weight-
ing may be less robust to propensity score misspecification than
other classes of estimators, as documented for instance in Kang
and Schafer (2007) and Waernbaum (2012). Alternative non- or
semiparametric estimators of direct and indirect effects include
the regression estimator of Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010)
and “multiply robust” estimation either based on the efficient in-
fluence function, see Tchetgen Tchetgen, and Shpitser (2012),
or on targeted maximum likelihood, see Zheng and van der Laan
(2012).
Note that if G and X were not confounded by W, As-
sumption 1(a) could be replaced by {Y (g′, x), X(g)}⊥G (ran-
dom assignment of G) and 1(b) by Y (g′, x)⊥X|G = g. This
would correspond to a nonparametric version of the model
described in (6) and (7). It is easy to show that in this
case the identification results (15) and (16) simplify to
ψ = E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1)
]
−E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|X) ·
1 − Pr(G = 1|X)
1 − Pr(G = 1)
]
, (17)
η = E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|X) ·
1 − Pr(G = 1|X)
1 − Pr(G = 1)
]
−E
[
Y · (1 − G)
1 − Pr(G = 1)
]
. (18)
Interestingly, (18) looks identical to the identification of the av-
erage treatment effect on the nontreated in Hirano, Imbens,
and Ridder (2003) based on weighting, however, under the
conceptually different framework of a conditionally indepen-
dent treatment given observed pretreatment (or pregroup) vari-
ables X. The crucial difference is that in Hirano, Imbens, and
Ridder (2003), conditioning on X controls for selection into the
treatment (or group), whereas here, with X being a post-group
mediator, conditioning on X controls for the indirect effect via
X to identify the unexplained component. Obviously, this is
only feasible if G and X are not confounded. In this case, any
nonparametric method for the average treatment effect on the
nontreated under conditionally independent treatment assign-
ment consistently estimates η, including matching, see Rubin
(1974), and doubly robust estimation, see Rothe and Firpo
(2013). However, ruling out any confounding appears restrictive
in empirical applications.
Before concluding this section, it has to be pointed out that
even though Assumption 1 improves on the identifying as-
sumptions implied by the standard decomposition by permit-
ting observed confounders of G and X, it is still quite restrictive.
In particular, it does not allow for post-group confounders of
X which are affected by G, which would make identification
more cumbersome. As discussed in the empirical application
in Section 4, it may, however, appear plausible that some vari-
ables influencing both the mediators and the outcome are them-
selves influenced by the group state (e.g., the development of
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personality traits as a function of gender/ethnicity). We therefore
briefly review alternative identification strategies suggested in
Robins and Richardson (2010), Albert and Nelson (2011), Tch-
etgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2012), Imai and Yamamoto
(2013), and Huber (2013) which do allow for post-group con-
founders that are a function of G based on various sets of
assumptions. A crucial difference to Assumption 1 is that in
addition to particular sequential ignorability assumptions, fur-
ther restrictions on the group-mediator, confounder-mediator, or
mediator-outcome relation are required for identification. Imai
and Yamamoto (2013), for instance, assumed that the individual
group-mediator-interaction effects are homogeneous (i.e., the
same for all individuals with the same values in X). Assump-
tion 5 in Huber (2013) restricts the average group-mediator-
interaction effects to be homogeneous conditional on the
pre and post-group confounders and assumes the outcome to
be linear in the mediators. Alternatively, Albert and Nelson
(2011) and Robins and Richardson (2010) acknowledge that the
parameters of interest are identified if the potential values of the
post-group confounders under G = 1 and G = 0 are either inde-
pendent of each other or the functional form of their dependence
is known (which appears, however, unrealistic in applications).
Finally, Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2012) showed
that identification is feasible (under particular ignorability con-
ditions) if all post-group confounders are binary and monotonic
in G or if there are no average interaction effects of the post-
group confounders and the mediators on the outcome (which is
testable in the data).5
3. SIMULATION
This section presents a brief simulation study in which the
following data-generating process (DGP) is considered:
G = I {αW + ξ > 0},
X = 0.5G + βW + ν,
Y = G + X + GX + βW + γXW + ,
W, ξ, ν,  ∼ N (0, 1), independently of each other.
ξ, ν,  are the error terms, while W is a potential confounder.
For β = 0, the mediator is confounded, for α, β = 0 both the
group and the mediator are confounded. Finally, if γ = 0, then
there exists an interaction of X and W in the outcome equation.
The explained component is ψ = E[0.5(1 + GX)|G = 1] =
0.5 + E[X|G = 1] = 1, while the unexplained component is
η = E[1 + (0 + 0.5G)|G = 0] = 1. We simulate 1000 times
for various choices of α, β, γ and two sample sizes (n =
5As elsewhere in empirical economics, it may not appear plausible that all
(pre- or post-group) confounders are observed. If credible instrumental vari-
ables for the group and/or the mediators are available, they may provide an
alternative source for identifying direct and indirect effects, see for instance
the nonparametric approaches in Imai, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2012) and Ya-
mamoto (2013). If no instruments are at hand and confounders are not observed,
partial identification based on deriving upper and lower bounds on the direct and
indirect effects might nevertheless be informative, see for instance (Cai et al.
2008; Flores and Flores-Lagunes 2010). However, most of these instrument-
and bounds-based approaches were developed for the case of a scalar mediator
and may not easily generalize to the framework of multiple mediators as usually
encountered in wage decompositions.
500, 2000), considering three different estimators: the standard
decomposition (“decomposition”) of Blinder (1973) and Oax-
aca (1973) based on (5), OLS estimation of direct and indirect
effects (“mediation.ols”), which controls for the confounder
W based on the linear Equations (11) and (12), and finally,
semiparametric inverse probability weighting (IPW) based on
the sample analogs of (15) and (16), respectively (“media-
tion.ipw”). The propensity scores Pr(G = 1|X,W ) and Pr(G =
1|W ) entering the IPW formulas are estimated by the covariate-
balancing propensity score method of Imai and Ratkovic (2014),
which models group assignment while at the same time opti-
mizing the covariate balance using an empirical likelihood ap-
proach.6
Table 1 presents the bias, standard deviation (s.d.), and root
mean squared error (RMSE) of the various estimators. For
α = 0, β = 0, γ = 0, W does neither confound X, nor G and
all methods are consistent and close to being unbiased. Not un-
expectedly, semiparametric IPW has a somewhat higher stan-
dard deviation than the parametric methods due to imposing
weaker assumptions. Setting β = 1 in the second panel of
Table 1 introduces confounding of the mediator. Now, the
standard decomposition is biased and has a substantially higher
RMSE than the other two methods which control for W. In the
third panel, α = 0.25, β = 1, γ = 0, which implies that also
G is confounded. This further increases the bias of the stan-
dard decomposition, while the other estimators are again almost
unbiased. In the fourth panel, α = 0.25, β = 1, γ = 0.5, such
that there exists an interaction of W and X. As the OLS es-
timator does not account for the latter (but only for W), it is
somewhat biased due to this misspecification. In contrast, IPW
remains close to being unbiased due to its higher flexibility w.r.t.
structural form assumptions and now dominates the other meth-
ods in terms of bias and RMSE. Summing up, the simulations
demonstrate the nonrobustness of the standard decomposition
to confounding and violations of functional form restrictions as
well as the potential gains coming from the use of more flexi-
ble estimation methods that are based on less rigid identifying
assumptions.
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
In this section, we provide an empirical illustration in which
we investigate the robustness of the results when applying vari-
ous decomposition methods to the ethnic wage gap among males
participating in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY79). The NLSY79 was designed to represent the youth
population in the U.S. in 1979 and consists of individuals that
were between 14 and 22 years old in that year. It was repeated
annually through 1994 and every other year ever after. The sur-
vey contains very rich information on labor market relevant
characteristics such as education, detailed work experience,
6IPW based on probit models for the propensity scores was also considered in the
simulations, but the results are not reported because it behaved very similarly to
IPW based on the empirical likelihood approach of Imai and Ratkovic (2014).
Note that semiparametric IPW estimation using parametric propensity score
models is
√
n-consistent, which can be shown in a sequential GMM framework
(see Newey 1984) in which propensity score estimation represents the first step
and the IPW decomposition the second step.
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Table 1. Simulations
n = 500 n = 2000
Explained comp. ψ Unexplained comp. η Explained comp. ψ Unexplained comp. η
Bias s.d. RMSE Bias s.d. RMSE Bias s.d. RMSE Bias s.d. RMSE
α = 0, β = 0, γ = 0 α = 0, β = 0, γ = 0
Decomposition −0.003 0.182 0.182 0.001 0.118 0.118 0.001 0.091 0.091 −0.000 0.055 0.055
Mediation.ols −0.003 0.182 0.182 0.001 0.118 0.118 0.001 0.091 0.091 −0.000 0.055 0.055
Mediation.ipw −0.004 0.198 0.198 0.002 0.143 0.143 0.001 0.099 0.099 0.000 0.067 0.067
α = 0, β = 1, γ = 0 α = 0, β = 0.5, γ = 0
Decomposition 0.246 0.319 0.403 −0.250 0.145 0.289 0.250 0.166 0.300 −0.252 0.070 0.261
Mediation.ols −0.003 0.181 0.181 0.001 0.117 0.117 0.001 0.091 0.091 −0.000 0.055 0.055
Mediation.ipw −0.008 0.211 0.211 0.006 0.167 0.167 −0.001 0.105 0.105 0.001 0.080 0.080
α = 0.25, β = 1, γ = 0 α = 0.5, β = 0.5, γ = 0
Decomposition 1.208 0.320 1.250 −0.240 0.148 0.282 1.204 0.159 1.215 −0.242 0.073 0.253
Mediation.ols −0.002 0.187 0.187 0.001 0.117 0.117 −0.001 0.092 0.092 0.000 0.056 0.056
Mediation.ipw −0.010 0.231 0.231 0.014 0.187 0.187 −0.003 0.109 0.109 0.002 0.085 0.085
α = 0.25, β = 1, γ = 0.5 α = 0.5, β = 0.5, γ = 0.5
Decomposition 1.449 0.388 1.500 −0.431 0.194 0.472 1.440 0.191 1.453 −0.429 0.096 0.439
Mediation.ols 0.102 0.214 0.237 −0.100 0.160 0.188 0.101 0.106 0.146 −0.100 0.075 0.125
Mediation.ipw −0.011 0.222 0.222 0.016 0.172 0.173 −0.004 0.105 0.105 0.005 0.077 0.078
NOTE: “Decomposition” refers to estimation based on (5), “mediation.ols” to OLS estimation of (11) and (12), and “mediation.ipw” to weighting based on (15) and (16), where
Pr(G = g|X,W ) and Pr(G = g|W ) are estimated by the (Imai and Ratkovic 2014) procedure.
occupational choices, and many others. Our analysis focuses
on males only, for whom the literature typically finds larger
ethnic wage differentials than for females, see, for instance,
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) or O’Neill and O’Neill
(2005). To be precise, we confine our sample to non-Hispanic
males to estimate the decomposition for blacks (G = 0) and
whites (G = 1).
The outcome of interest (Y) is the log hourly wage in the year
2000 of the then 35–43 years old survey participants, which is
observed for 2571 cases or 48% of the initial non-Hispanic male
sample, thereof 851 blacks and 1720 whites. Similarly to what is
standard in the literature, our variables X characterizing the ex-
plained component include age, education, labor market history,
tenure with the current employer, industry, type of occupation,
whether living in an urban area, and region. Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics on these variables, namely the respective
mean values for blacks and whites, the mean differences, and the
t-values (t-val) and p-values (p-val) based on two-sample t-tests.
Table 2. Means and mean differences in mediators across blacks and whites
Blacks (G = 0) Whites (G = 1) Difference t-val p-val
Age 20.054 20.053 0.001 −0.007 0.994
Education 12.910 13.609 −0.700 7.479 0.000
Weeks ever worked 87.765 95.258 −7.493 4.843 0.000
Tenure at primary employer in days 233.174 313.003 −79.829 7.155 0.000
Industry: mining 0.005 0.008 −0.003 1.077 0.282
Industry: construction 0.099 0.120 −0.021 1.635 0.102
Industry: manufacturing 0.213 0.234 −0.022 1.245 0.213
Industry: transport 0.143 0.098 0.045 −3.222 0.001
Industry: sales 0.129 0.128 0.001 −0.096 0.923
Industry: finance 0.022 0.050 −0.028 3.790 0.000
Industry: business 0.092 0.084 0.007 −0.615 0.538
Industry: personal services 0.021 0.010 0.011 −1.939 0.053
Industry: entertainment 0.007 0.018 −0.011 2.549 0.011
Industry: professional services 0.109 0.112 −0.002 0.179 0.858
Industry: public admin. 0.067 0.052 0.015 −1.448 0.148
Occupation: manager, professionals 0.161 0.335 −0.174 10.238 0.000
Occupation: support services 0.143 0.170 −0.027 1.792 0.073
Occupation: farming 0.025 0.029 −0.004 0.657 0.511
Occupation: production 0.170 0.223 −0.052 3.200 0.001
Occupation: operators 0.340 0.169 0.170 −9.167 0.000
In urban area 0.736 0.583 0.152 −7.924 0.000
Region: Northeast 0.127 0.157 −0.030 2.088 0.037
Region: West 0.082 0.152 −0.070 5.473 0.000
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Table 3. Black-White wage gap decomposition based on NLSY79
Total gap in log wages Explained component ˆψ Unexplained component ηˆ
Estimate s.e. p-val Estimate s.e. p-val % of total Estimate s.e. p-val % of total
Decomposition 0.434 0.040 0.000 0.299 0.035 0.000 68.9 0.135 0.047 0.004 31.1
Ipw 0.434 0.044 0.000 0.306 0.041 0.000 70.4 0.128 0.057 0.024 29.6
Mediation.ols 0.288 0.048 0.000 0.176 0.033 0.000 61.3 0.112 0.053 0.036 38.7
Mediation.ipw 0.280 0.046 0.000 0.171 0.060 0.004 60.9 0.109 0.069 0.114 39.1
NOTE: “Decomposition” refers to estimation based on (5), “ipw” to weighting based on (17) and (18) not controlling for W, “mediation.ols” to OLS estimation of (11) and (12) which
controls for W, and “mediation.ipw” to weighting based on (15) and (16) which also controls for W. All standard errors (s.e.) are based on 999 bootstrap replications.
We see that the groups differ significantly in terms of labor mar-
ket experience, job characteristics, and region. As mentioned
before, conventional decompositions would merely make use
of X without conditioning on potential confounders of X and/or
G. Here, we also consider controlling for pregroup variables W
that reflect family background and could potentially confound
the group variable and the mediators. To be specific, W contains
mother’s and father’s levels of education as well as dummies
indicating whether the respondent or her/his mother were born
in a foreign country.
Table 3 provides the estimates of the total wage gap as well as
the explained and unexplained components using four different
decomposition methods along with standard errors (s.e.) and p-
values (p-val) based on 999 bootstrap replications. It also gives
the explained and unexplained components as percentages of
the total gap (% of total) to assess their relative importance. The
total gap in average log wages of blacks and whites is 0.434 log
points. The standard decomposition of Blinder (1973) and Oax-
aca (1973) (“decomposition”) suggests that 0.299 log points or
68.9% of the total gap are explained by differences in X, while
0.135 log points or 31.1% are unexplained. Both estimates are
highly significant. We also consider the IPW estimator (“ipw”)
based on (17) and (18), which is more flexible in terms of func-
tional form assumptions but does not control for W either. As in
the simulations, Pr(G = 1|X) is estimated by the empirical like-
lihood approach of Imai and Ratkovic (2014). The propensity
score specification is provided in Table 4 in Appendix A.2. As
this semiparametric method does not extrapolate to sparse data
regions, its applicability hinges on a sufficiently high overlap
of the propensity scores across groups, also known as common
support. Figures 4 and 5 in Appendix A.3 provides density esti-
mates of the within-group propensity scores using the logspline
command in R. The common support appears decent, so that
for any individual comparable observations w.r.t. the propensity
score can be found in the respective other group. We see that de-
spite the more flexible functional form assumptions, the results
based on weighting (without controlling for W) are very similar
to those of the standard decomposition.
We also consider two estimators controlling for family back-
ground characteristics W, namely OLS estimation of direct and
indirect effects (“mediation.ols”) based on Equations (11) and
(12), and IPW (“mediation.ipw”) based on (15) and (16). The
propensity score specification of Pr(G = 1|X,W ) is provided
in Appendix A.2 and the common support, which is again quite
satisfactory, is displayed in Appendix A.3.7 Note that the total
7We also investigated whether the Imai and Ratkovic (2014)-based estimate
of Pr(G = 1|X,W ) does indeed optimally balance the distributions of X,W
gap now corresponds to the difference in log wages of blacks and
whites after making both groups comparable in W. It is consid-
erably smaller than the (initial) wage gap ignoring confounding
by W (0.434), no matter whether estimation is based on OLS
(0.288) or IPW (0.280). This suggests that the total impact of
ethnicity on wages is overestimated when not controlling for
family background. The same applies to the magnitudes of ex-
plained components, which drop substantially when controlling
for W (from roughly 0.3 to less than 0.18 log points). The un-
explained components, in contrast, decrease only moderately to
0.11 log points. Therefore, their relative importance measured
as percentage of the total gap increases somewhat to 39%. As
before, the OLS and IPW estimates are very similar, with the
latter being somewhat nosier because of weaker functional form
assumptions. In particular, the unexplained component based on
IPW is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level,
while that based on OLS is significant at the 5% level.
Our results suggest that the decomposition estimates are not
robust to ignoring potential pre-group confounders, but may en-
tail overestimation of the absolute values of the explained and
unexplained components as well as the total wage gap. How-
ever, even the estimates based on controlling for W should not be
taken at face value. First, in addition to the family background
variables considered, there might exist further pre-group con-
founders that were omitted in the estimation. Potential examples
include parents’ personality traits, parents’ health, and neigh-
borhood conditions, which might differ systemically across G
or X and at the same time affect labor market success later in
life, entailing a violation of Assumption 1. Second, as a fur-
ther issue not considered in our analysis, there may also exist
post-group confounders of X that are themselves potentially af-
fected by G. This case is ruled out in Assumption 1, but clearly
a plausible scenario, given that the mediators are measured with
a substantial time lag after the determination of G (at birth).
As an example, consider the possibility that G affects the de-
velopment of personality traits (e.g., through a systematically
different exposure to discrimination, peer groups, etc., while
growing up), which themselves influence X (e.g., schooling and
occupation) as well as potential wages. Further possible sources
of post-group confounding are attrition and selection into em-
ployment, as roughly half of the initial sample had dropped out
across groups as one would expect from empirical likelihood estimation. In
the original data prior to IPW weighting, the mean and maximum absolute
differences in X,W across groups amount to 1.698 and 79.828, respectively.
The standardized mean and maximum absolute differences (standardized by
the standard deviations of the respective variables) are 0.142 and 0.592. After
IPW weighting, any of the measures is 0.000, so that X,W have been balanced
successfully.
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of the survey by 2000 or did not report any employment.8 There-
fore, controlling for pre-birth confounders does likely not suffice
for tackling mediator endogeneity. At the very least, our analy-
sis and the sensitivity of the results to different sets of assump-
tions demonstrate the importance of considering the problem of
confounding in wage decompositions, an issue apparently ne-
glected in much of the literature. Future research may discuss
the implementation and attractiveness of alternative identifica-
tion strategies that also allow for post-group confounders (see,
for instance, the work of Robins and Richardson 2010, Albert
and Nelson 2011, Imai and Yamamoto 2013, Huber 2013, and
Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele 2012 mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.3) in the context of wage decompositions.
5. CONCLUSION
This article has made explicit the identifying assumptions un-
derlying conventional decompositions of gender or ethnic wage
gaps, which continue to receive much attention in the empirical
labor literature, by translating the decomposition into an equiv-
alent model for mediation analysis. Inspecting the latter imme-
diately shows that conventional decompositions do not control
for confounders of the group variable (e.g., gender or ethnic-
ity) and/or the variables characterizing the explained component
(e.g., education and occupation), if the latter are determined af-
ter the group variable. This appears to be the standard case,
as gender or ethnicity are determined at or prior to birth and
therefore precede mediators like education or profession. For
this reason, we have suggested the use of an alternative set of
identifying assumptions that assumes exogeneity of the group
variable and the mediators only conditional on observed con-
founders. Then, the unexplained and explained components of
the decomposition can be nonparametrically identified by using
a simple weighting expression that reweights observations by
the inverse of the conditional propensity to belong to a particu-
lar group given the mediators and confounders. Finally, we have
provided a simulation study as well as an empirical application
to data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, in
which we have also pointed to approaches permitting to further
relax our identifying assumptions.
A. APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Equations (15) and (16) under
Assumption 1
The following proof is closely related to Huber (2013). To prove
Equations (15) and (16) under Assumption 1, we need to show that
E[Y (g,X(g))] for g ∈ {1, 0} and E[Y (1, X(0))] are identified. Starting
with the former, note that
E[Y (g,X(g))] =
∫
E[Y (g,X(g))|W = w]dFW (w)
=
∫
E[Y |G = g,W = w]dFW (w)
8We refer to MaCurdy, Mroz, and Gritz (1998) for a detailed analysis of the
attrition patterns in the NLSY79.
= E
[
E
[
Y · I {G = g}
Pr(G = g|W )
∣∣∣∣W = w
]]
= E
[
Y · I {G = g}
Pr(G = g|W )
]
. (A.1)
The first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and from
replacing the expectation by an integral, the second from Assumption
1(a), the third from basic probability theory and from replacing the
integral by the expectation, and the last from the law of iterated expec-
tations.
Concerning the latter,
E[Y (1, X(0))]
=
∫∫
E[Y (1, x)|X(0) = x,W = w]dFX(0)|W =w(x)dFW (w)
=
∫∫
E[Y (1, x)|G = 1, X = x,W = w]
×dFX|G= 0,W =w(x)dFW (w)
=
∫∫
E[Y |G = 1, X = x,W = w] · Pr(G = 0|X,W )
Pr(G = 0|W )
×dFX|W =w(x)dFW (w)
= E
[
E
[
E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|X,W )
∣∣∣∣X = x,W = w
]
×1 − Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1 − Pr(G = 1|W )
∣∣∣∣W = w
]]
= E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1 − Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1 − Pr(G = 1|W )
]
. (A.2)
The first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and
from replacing the outer expectations by integrals, the second from
Assumptions 1(a) and 1(b), the third from Bayes’ theorem, the fourth
from basic probability theory and from replacing the integrals by ex-
pectations, and the last from the law of iterated expectations.
Therefore, the explained component ψ = E[Y (1, X(1))] −
E[Y (1, X(0))] is equal to
E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|W )
]
− E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|X,W )
×1 − Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1 − Pr(G = 1|W )
]
, (A.3)
while the unexplained component η = E[Y (1, X(0))] − E[Y (0, X(0))]
is equal to
E
[
Y · G
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1 − Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1 − Pr(G = 1|W )
]
−E
[
Y · (1 − G)
1 − Pr(G = 1|W )
]
. (A.4)
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A.2 Propensity Score Specifications
Table 4. Propensity score specifications based on the Imai and Ratkovic (2014) procedure
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) Pr(G = 1|X)
coef. s.e. z-val p-val coef. s.e. z-val p-val
X
Age −0.047 0.019 −2.418 0.016 −0.051 0.023 −2.245 0.025
Education: 12 yrs −0.421 0.289 −1.455 0.146 −0.061 0.194 −0.314 0.754
Education: 13 yrs −0.815 0.373 −2.185 0.029 −0.074 0.329 −0.224 0.823
Education: 14 yrs −0.500 0.419 −1.192 0.233 0.170 0.370 0.460 0.645
Education: 15 yrs −1.349 0.431 −3.133 0.002 −0.588 0.376 −1.564 0.118
Education: 16 yrs −0.634 0.375 −1.689 0.091 0.329 0.226 1.458 0.145
Education: 17 yrs −0.820 0.544 −1.508 0.131 0.195 0.565 0.344 0.731
Education: 18 yrs or more −0.321 0.447 −0.717 0.473 0.767 0.353 2.174 0.030
Weeks ever worked 0.005 0.002 2.546 0.011 0.003 0.003 1.040 0.298
Weeks ever worked missing −0.687 0.533 −1.289 0.197 −0.599 0.442 −1.356 0.175
Years ever worked 0.122 0.018 6.947 0.000 0.137 0.017 8.211 0.000
Tenure at primary employer 0.000 0.000 1.155 0.248 0.000 0.000 1.875 0.061
Tenure missing 0.508 0.402 1.263 0.207 0.367 0.389 0.943 0.346
Worked before 0.055 0.176 0.313 0.754 0.147 0.223 0.660 0.509
Industry: mining 0.033 0.691 0.048 0.961 −0.275 0.524 −0.525 0.599
Industry: construction −0.166 0.223 −0.746 0.456 −0.254 0.229 −1.106 0.269
Industry: manufact. durables −0.488 0.253 −1.930 0.054 −0.586 0.251 −2.339 0.019
Industry: manufact. non-dur. −0.310 0.203 −1.523 0.128 −0.285 0.229 −1.244 0.213
Industry: transport −0.829 0.201 −4.130 0.000 −0.907 0.190 −4.780 0.000
Industry: wholesale −0.468 0.540 −0.866 0.386 −0.197 0.398 −0.494 0.621
Industry: retail −0.479 0.204 −2.347 0.019 −0.579 0.247 −2.340 0.019
Industry: finance −0.171 0.389 −0.440 0.660 −0.293 0.274 −1.068 0.286
Industry: business −0.399 0.211 −1.893 0.058 −0.400 0.210 −1.904 0.057
Industry: personal services −0.891 0.436 −2.044 0.041 −1.009 0.547 −1.843 0.065
Industry: entertainment 1.112 0.523 2.127 0.033 0.651 0.402 1.618 0.106
Industry: professional services −0.651 0.256 −2.542 0.011 −0.816 0.222 −3.671 0.000
Industry: public admin. −0.757 0.382 −1.981 0.048 −0.831 0.488 −1.703 0.089
Profession: manager, professionals 1.102 0.217 5.074 0.000 1.025 0.222 4.623 0.000
Profession: support services 0.649 0.228 2.842 0.004 0.739 0.248 2.981 0.003
Profession: farming 0.580 0.415 1.398 0.162 0.498 0.402 1.238 0.216
Profession: production 0.834 0.226 3.686 0.000 0.768 0.213 3.603 0.000
Profession: operators 0.043 0.217 0.199 0.842 −0.077 0.207 −0.372 0.710
In urban area −0.992 0.141 −7.013 0.000 −0.863 0.152 −5.665 0.000
Urban area missing 0.301 1.105 0.273 0.785 0.557 0.701 0.794 0.427
Region: Northeast 0.282 0.152 1.856 0.063 0.363 0.248 1.466 0.143
Region: West 0.776 0.196 3.959 0.000 0.974 0.255 3.817 0.000
W
Foreign born −0.463 0.555 −0.834 0.405
Mother foreign born 0.910 0.392 2.323 0.020
Mothers educ.: 12 0.652 0.181 3.601 0.000
Mothers educ.: 13 0.469 0.456 1.029 0.304
Mothers educ.: 14 0.554 0.478 1.159 0.247
Mothers educ.: 15 0.470 0.515 0.912 0.362
Mothers educ.: 16 −0.053 0.379 −0.141 0.888
Mothers educ.: 17 0.226 0.901 0.251 0.802
Mothers educ.: 18 or more −0.498 0.685 −0.728 0.467
Mothers educ. missing −0.155 0.372 −0.416 0.678
Fathers educ.: 12 0.414 0.216 1.918 0.055
Fathers educ.: 13 1.701 0.490 3.472 0.001
Fathers educ.: 14 0.992 0.427 2.324 0.020
Fathers educ.: 15 1.372 0.531 2.584 0.010
Fathers educ.: 16 1.516 0.301 5.041 0.000
Fathers educ.: 17 0.519 0.522 0.995 0.320
Fathers educ.: 18 or more 2.132 0.403 5.294 0.000
Fathers educ. missing −1.042 0.226 −4.617 0.000
Constant −0.410 0.419 −0.977 0.328 −0.356 0.642 −0.555 0.579
NOTE: The variables in X are measured in 1998 and those in W in 1979.
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A.3 Propensity Score Distributions
Figure 4. Density estimates of the estimates of Pr(G = 1|X) across groups. Note: density estimation is based on splines using the (default
setting of the) logspline command for R. The lower and upper bounds of the support of the propensity scores are set to 0 and 1.
Figure 5. Density estimates of the estimates of Pr(G = 1|X,W ) across groups. Note: density estimation is based on splines using the (default
setting of the) logspline command for R. The lower and upper bounds of the support of the propensity scores are set to 0 and 1.
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